

HEADLINE SERIES

**FOREIGN POLICY
ASSOCIATION**

India: 15 Years of Freedom

Paul Grimes
New York Times correspondent

954 0861

62-15125

Grimes

Headline series

India: 15 years of freedom

kansas city



public library

kansas city, missouri

Books will be issued only
on presentation of library card.

Please report lost cards and
change of residence promptly.

Card holders are responsible for
all books, records, films, pictures
or other library materials
checked out on their cards.



S

Page 3

...s most populous democracy, completed its third general election in ... of nation-building. What have the people and leaders of India accomplished since independence? What are the prospects for successful economic and social development and for further growth of democratic institutions? Writing on the spot, Paul Grimes offers a balanced appraisal and a cautious forecast.

**TALKING IT
OVER, A Discussion Guide**

Page 60

NUMBER 152

MARCH-APRIL 1962

The Author

PAUL GRIMES has been South Asia staff correspondent for *The New York Times* since 1959, based in New Delhi. He has traveled frequently throughout India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon and Nepal, reporting on news developments in those countries. He also lived and worked in India, 1950-53, as information officer for the United States Information Service in Bombay. He is a graduate of Cornell University.

The Foreign Policy Association is a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan, educational organization. Its objective is to stimulate wider interest, greater understanding and more effective participation by American citizens in world affairs. However, as an organization, it takes no position on issues of United States foreign policy. In its publications the FPA strives to insure factual accuracy; but the opinions expressed are those of the authors and not of the organization.

HEADLINE SERIES, No. 152, March 20, 1962, published bimonthly by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 E. 46th St., New York 17, N. Y. President, JOHN W. NASON; HEADLINE SERIES Editor, PHILIP VAN SLYCK; Assistant Editor, GWEN CROWE. Subscription rates, \$3.00 for 6 issues. Single copies, 50¢. SECOND-CLASS POSTAGE PAID AT NEW YORK, N. Y. Copyright, 1962 by FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC. Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor. Manufactured in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 62-14855



959
E786L

India: 15 Years of Freedom

by Paul Grimes

SHORTLY BEFORE MIDNIGHT ON AUGUST 14, 1947, a solemn-faced Jawaharlal Nehru rose before an expectant Constituent Assembly in New Delhi. In a calm, clear voice, he declared:

"Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. . . . It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity."

At exactly midnight India emerged into freedom after nearly two centuries of British rule. It had attained a goal toward which nationalist leaders had struggled for decades. The struggle had been largely nonviolent, the exertion of moral pressure rather than force. Indians of widely diverse backgrounds and a variety of political and economic views had united behind Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, their mahatma, or "great soul."

Independence and Partition

Nehru, the mahatma's political heir, tried to impress on the enthusiastic independence-eve crowd that the attainment of freedom was a beginning, not an end. Independence meant the

creation of not one free country, but two—India and Pakistan. While the Indian prime minister spoke, the partitioned subcontinent was in the midst of a two-way migration between the two countries of an estimated 11 million persons. Before the migration ended, thousands upon thousands were slaughtered in religious outbreaks among Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs.

Would the overwhelming Hindu majority and the numerically large Muslim minority that remained in India be able to live together in peace? Would Indians from different regions, who spoke different languages and had different traditions and customs, be able to work together for the common good? The anti-British struggle had provided a unifying bond that, after the attainment of freedom, gradually disappeared.



Freedom alone could not provide wheat and rice to feed the grossly underfed populace, which was increasing then by 1.3 percent a year. Freedom could not teach illiterates (then about 85 percent of the population) to read and write. Freedom could not provide work for the tens of millions of jobless and underemployed. Freedom could not build the industry that would help create a viable, self-reliant economy.

In his independence-eve speech Nehru warned Indians that “we have to labor and to work, and work hard, to give reality to our dreams.” “As long as there are tears and suffering,” he declared, “so long our work will not be over.”

The failure to accomplish economic miracles has heightened dissatisfaction in many quarters. This, in turn, has encouraged prejudice and discrimination in the quest to better one's lot and to find a scapegoat for one's failures. Divisive forces have fed on intense loyalties to one's religion, caste, language and region. Intergroup rivalry and jealousy have, to a large extent, replaced the bond forged in the common struggle to oust the British.

Such forces are not peculiar to India but are common in most pluralistic societies. In India, however, they appear to be increasing at a time when planners feel that a much faster rate of

Mahatma ►
Gandhi



◀ Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru

Photos, Press
Information Bureau.

economic growth is mandatory. The planners insist that human energy must be marshaled to work for the good of the whole.

Current Goals

The biggest challenges that India faces in 1962 are perhaps the following:

1. To increase agricultural production to the point of self-sufficiency—to provide adequate nourishment and clothing to all the people without any need for agricultural imports.

2. Through the careful exploitation of natural resources and the development of industry, to expand output and produce exports that will help pay off foreign debts, help curb unemployment by creating millions of jobs and ultimately meet domestic demands for consumer goods.

3. To meet the rising needs of a growing population—from 345 million in 1947 to 434.8 million in 1961, according to UN sources—which dilutes the results of economic progress to date.

4. To provide free, universal education in a massive effort to equip Indians with needed skills, create a broad social awareness and root out the superstition, lethargy and bigotry that breed on ignorance.

National leaders stress that all problems must be tackled simultaneously, that each has a direct bearing on the others. They recognize that population increase cannot be curbed, for example, without the education that will provide the incentive and motivation for birth control. National leaders recognize that as more people are educated, the demand will grow for better jobs. They recognize that agriculture cannot be fully developed without effective land reform, without industry to provide fertilizers and improved seeds and tools, without reclamation and hydroelectric projects to irrigate farm land and provide power to factories. They recognize that both agriculture and industry require scientists, trained technicians and efficient managerial personnel. They recognize that industrial develop-

ment requires the simultaneous exploitation of raw materials and the improvement of transportation to carry these materials to the factory and convey finished products away.

Progress and Sense of Purpose

Despite the staggering burden of India's problems, however, some striking progress is noticeable over the last 15 years. A complex of heavy industry has developed in the eastern states of Bihar and West Bengal. Light manufacturing of a wide variety of products—chemicals, plastics, sewing machines and bicycles, to name a few—has mushroomed on the outskirts of big and medium-sized cities. The names Bhakra-Nangal, Hirakud, Koyna and Tungabhadra represent vast new projects that have irrigated millions of acres and provided millions of kilowatts of electric power. Malaria, once the most devastating of India's diseases, has been almost eliminated.

Though far overshadowed by the problems, the progress has fostered a sense of pride in many Indians of diverse backgrounds. "He is one of us. We have done this," comments a wide-eyed farmer as he watches an electrical engineer at work in a power station that has revolutionized thousands of homes. "Those are our people, they control our fate," thinks an aboriginal tribesman who sits in the visitors' gallery of the Lok Sabha (House of the People), the lower house of Parliament. "No, I cannot read," a scavenger says, "but my son is learning. He will become a *babu* (office worker) and he will read to me."

Comparisons are inevitable between India, the most populous non-Communist country, and Communist China, the world's most populous country. Each is struggling to develop in its own way—India through socialism within a democratic framework, and China through totalitarian Marxism. They are neighbors in Asia—since 1959, antagonistic neighbors because of a dispute over 51,000 square miles of territory. If the Indian economic path proves the better, other underdeveloped countries in Asia and

Africa may persist along the same route. If India fails, it and many countries that are watching both India and China may find communism their only alternative.

Available data show that the annual rate of economic growth in Communist China in the 1950's may have been three times that of India. Because of natural and man-made calamities, however, the Chinese agricultural program suffered in 1959, failed almost completely in 1960 and suffered further last year. Nature and mismanagement also severely hit Chinese industrial output. Reports say that millions of workers have been shunted from light industries to farms. Malnutrition, apathy and dissension are reported among the Chinese peasantry. Rice and cloth rations have been reduced, and riots were reported in several cities.

India, meanwhile, has suffered no major setbacks in the last few years, although there are disappointments and frustration at failures to reach targets, to move ahead fast enough. There is no food or cloth rationing in India, and consumption increased (although at a much lower rate than China's before 1959). This was accompanied, however, by rising prices.

Gradually, Indians have developed a sense of purpose, if not yet a spirit of unity. Upon the attainment of freedom in 1947, the major question was, "Where do we go from here?" But 15 years of relatively stable government and more than a decade of economic planning have changed the question to, "We know where we are going, but can we get there before our problems overwhelm us?"

Political Evolution

INDIA EMERGED INTO FREEDOM AS A MOTLEY conglomeration of semiautonomous units that had no reason for cohesion once the British had gone. Partition of the subcontinent left India with a total area of about 1.26 million square miles, slightly more than one-third the size of the United States. This was divided into nine large provinces formerly ruled by British governors, five smaller ones that had been administered directly by the British regime in New Delhi and 555 princely states, including Jammu and Kashmir, which actually was not acceded to India until October, 1947, and is still disputed with Pakistan.

This structure had been satisfactory to the British from the standpoint of ease of administration. It was untenable, however, to Indian nationalists. They could not tolerate the continuation of princely rule, which sometimes was enlightened, but more often was feudally autocratic. Many nationalists also disliked the way boundaries of the large provinces ignored cultural differences and affinities of the people.

Integration of Princely States

Princely states—the domains of maharajas, nawabs and other titleholders—were sprinkled throughout the country. They ranged in area from 86,024 square miles (Kashmir) to .29 square miles (Vejanones in Saurashtra). Their hereditary rulers had given the British the complete say in foreign affairs and the right to inter-

ferred in domestic matters in the event of maladministration, gross injustice and other specified circumstances. Essentially, however, the princes held absolute power over their subjects.

Immediately after India became free the late Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, then deputy prime minister, assisted by V.P. Menon, an able civil servant, began the arduous task of integrating the princely states with the rest of the country. They were successful in all but Kashmir.

When India became a republic on January 26, 1950, after two and a half years as a dominion, it consisted of 27 states. Nine of them corresponded to the major provinces of British India, eight, including Kashmir, were former princely states or amalgamations of them and ten were small states under the direct control of New Delhi. In addition, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal were made a centrally administered territory.

Few political leaders were satisfied. Many considered the number too large, especially the number under control of New Delhi. They disliked the lumping together of former princely areas under the ceremonial, if not political, leadership of some of the most prominent ex-rulers.

Problem of Language Divisions

The biggest opposition arose, however, over language. The Constitution listed 14 languages recognized as official for state business. But the way most states were aligned, the official adoption of regional languages was difficult.

In Bombay State, for example, Gujarati was predominant in the north, Marathi in the center and east and Kannada in the extreme south. All three languages crossed state lines. This meant that a Gujarati-speaking resident of Bombay considered himself akin to his neighbors in Saurashtra, who shared his language and other aspects of his culture, but felt he had little in common with his fellow Bombayites who spoke Marathi or Kannada.

All three linguistic groups felt that they should join their brethren across the border in states of their own. Each felt that

this was necessary to give those persons who spoke only one language—a regional one—a fair chance at such economic opportunities as government employment.

Perhaps the biggest sense of deprivation was felt among the 33 million Indians who speak Telegu. Although they formed one of the biggest linguistic groups, they were divided between the states of Madras and Hyderabad and dominated neither.

Telegu-speaking politicians considered this intolerable, especially since their people were among the most impoverished in a generally poor country. They agitated for the partition of Madras to create a Telegu-speaking state of Andhra. Prime Minister Nehru staunchly opposed them. He argued that linguistics divided Indians at a time when they should strive for unity.

Nehru's argument failed. In December 1952 Potti Sriramulu, a political leader, died on the 58th day of a fast in support of Andhra. Widespread violence and sabotage followed. Nehru capitulated and on October 1, 1953 Andhra became a state.

This set a precedent. Effective November 1, 1956, the map of the entire country was redrawn linguistically to create fourteen states (including the disputed Kashmir) and six territories. Still, many Indians were dissatisfied.

Bombay still had two main linguistic groups because its Marathi- and Gujarati-speaking inhabitants could not agree on the disposition of the city of Bombay. Only after several hundred persons had been killed in riots and the ruling Congress party was threatened with electoral defeat was the state bifurcated in May 1960 into Gujarat and Maharashtra, the latter getting the city of Bombay.

In Punjab the followers of the Sikh religion continue to agitate for a state in which only their language, Punjabi in the Gurmukhi script, would be official. In Assam, the large minority of Bengali-speaking inhabitants oppose the imposition of Assamese on them. In south India, a formidable movement is fighting efforts to replace English by Hindi, a northern tongue, as the national official language.

Lack of National Language

Language is perhaps the most potent divisive force in India. To understand this, one must realize that there has never been a truly national language. It should be remembered that India is a conglomeration of cultures, some of which go back thousands of years.

The closest approach to a national language in India is English, but it is spoken by only 1 percent of the people. Hindi (a derivative of Sanskrit), which is allied to other northern languages, is spoken by about 150 million persons. Hindi has no relationship, however, to the Dravidian languages of the 87 million southerners.

When India became free, nationalists firmly rejected English as a common language and urged that it be replaced as soon as possible. The Constitution provides for its replacement by Hindi as the national official language by 1965. Educated Indians appear to have grown increasingly aware, however, that to discard English before Hindi becomes generally known would be politically and economically perilous. The outlook now is that the government will encourage the progressive use of Hindi but that English will remain the subsidiary official language long after 1965. Meanwhile, it has been decided to make the study of English and Hindi compulsory, beginning with secondary school. And it has been decided that pupils whose mother tongue is Hindi must learn some other Indian language—for example, a southern one. Many Indians, therefore, are likely to become trilingual.


Religion and Caste Rivalries

Another major divisive force is religious bias. In 1961 at least 200 were killed in religious outbreaks in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. Still another force is a feeling among hill peoples that they are economically suppressed and that their cultures are threatened by Indians of the plains. Such sentiment is illustrated by the long campaign of guerrilla terrorism by Naga tribesmen in remote northeastern India who want independence.

The Ford Foundation
(William R. Simmons)



A Naga tribesman
in ceremonial dress




Playing pachisi on a Delhi sidewalk
With a Ford Foundation grant the
Delhi Municipal Corporation expects
to improve recreational facilities.

With a similar grant, a Community
Development Project in south India
has improved this well. Previously
the women had to draw the water
laboriously in buckets.



The Ford Foundation (William R. Simmons)



In 1960 a measure of self-government was provided on paper in preparation for creation of a new Indian state to be called Nagaland. Divisiveness is also fostered along caste lines. In Mysore and Rajasthan, members of different Hindu castes have bitterly feuded for control of state Congress organizations.

Nehru is clearly concerned about growing political exploitation of divisiveness. What is most needed, he feels, is the promotion of a sense of "Indian-ness," regardless of language, religion, region or caste. He does not feel that India is in imminent danger of disintegration, but he warns that economic planning cannot succeed unless all Indians work together for the common good.

Federal-State Relations

Under the Constitution of 1950, India is a federation of states. Considerable power, however, is concentrated in the central government, which controls foreign affairs, defense, communications, currency and all other matters not specifically reserved to the states or shared by the states with the center. In addition, the president has emergency powers. He can act when "the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance (actual or potential)."

He can assume the functions of a state government if he is satisfied that that government cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. On the advice of his government, he used this power in Kerala in July 1959, when he ousted a Communist government that had been accused of misrule. Dr. Prasad, acting through the governor of Kerala and a senior civil servant who was sent there as "adviser," issued administrative orders for six months. The central Parliament legislated on matters normally reserved to the state. In February 1960, after state-wide elections, a new legislature was seated, an anti-Communist government was installed in Kerala and the emergency was ended.

As president, Dr. Prasad has played principally a ceremonial role, leaving control of the government to Nehru. It appears

constitutionally possible, however, that the president could use his emergency powers to amass considerable power himself. This concerns some students of Indian government. They wonder what might happen if a leftist president, acting on the pretense of unrest or disorder, ousted a middle-of-the-road or rightist state government. Steps to define the president's power more specifically are anticipated, especially since the next prime minister is unlikely to have nearly the personal stature of Nehru. 5

Nehru's Leadership and Congress

Nehru has been head of the government since September 1946, when he became *de facto* prime minister in an interim government, 11 months before the British left. His Congress party has consistently controlled about three-quarters of the seats in Parliament.

Congress has two main strong points. One is a strong party organization that in some states and districts has similarities to the old Tammany organization in New York. The other is the personal magnetism of Prime Minister Nehru. This magnetism helps to maintain discipline at top levels. Without it, the party organization might fragment.

Congress members, with a few exceptions, pay lip service to socialist ideals at the party's annual conventions. Most expressions of criticism are effectively stilled by a few words from the prime minister. But state governments have often been slow—sometimes deliberately, sometimes under heavy pressure from vested interests—to implement party programs. Many influential Congress politicians, including some in the cabinet, have made it clear that they personally dislike anything that smacks of socialism, although they would not defy Nehru openly. 6

So Congress is a catchall—a party that is based more on political expediency than philosophy. This is different from the days of the independence struggle, when it was a movement with one major goal—the peaceful ouster of British rule. Today, politicians of diverse views and objectives flock to Congress because they feel 6

that it is safer to be on the side of Nehru, the idol of the Indian masses, than against him.

Opposition Parties

There is no formidable opposition to Congress. Only the Communists are potentially a long-range threat, based on the present political picture. A number of other parties exist, but the programs of most are either similar to that of Congress or are largely negative. The main attraction of the Praja (People's) Socialist party in its early days, for example, was the respect commanded by its principal founders Asoka Mehta, Acharya J. B. Kripalani, Jayaprakash Narayan and Rammanohar Lohia. Of them, however, only Mehta is still in the party.

Kripalani resigned last year, avowedly because he did not want to be bound to the party line. When he lost to Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon in the February election in North Bombay, he ran as an independent with the support of the Praja Socialist, Swatantra and Jan Sangh parties. Narayan, who once was widely considered the most likely successor to Nehru, left party politics in 1957. He now works for various causes, notably the land-gift movement of Acharya Vinoba Bhave, and has become a strong advocate of a party-less democracy. Lohia, who opposed Nehru in the recent Parliamentary election in Allahabad, has become the vociferous head of the small, left-wing Socialist party.

In the summer of 1959, amid considerable fanfare, the Swatantra (Freedom) party was born on a platform that preached free enterprise and deplored economic planning and cooperative farming. Its leaders are mainly former Congress members, representatives of big business and a handful of retired civil servants and disgruntled princes. Its principal spokesman and biggest attraction is 83-year-old Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras—a one-time close associate of Gandhi and Nehru—who was governor general (the only Indian to hold the office) from 1948 until India became a republic in 1950.

Even its leaders admit privately, however, that the Swatantra party has not attracted the backing for which they had hoped.

They accuse Congress of unfair practices—of having spent vast sums on a variety of pressure tactics to block opponents. There is at least an element of truth in such charges. Many persons who ideologically favor free enterprise have stuck with Congress because they have made profits—and want to continue to do so—through licenses and contracts granted by state Congress governments. In rural India, meanwhile, Congress has over the years built up unmatched political machines.

To the right of Congress, a potentially formidable party is the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (Indian People's party). It denies any bias, but it clearly caters to and fosters Hindu prejudices. It has attracted considerable support in northern India through its promotion of the Hindi language and its frequent anti-Pakistani outbursts. Its leaders have made clear repeatedly that they do not trust India's large Muslim minority.

Communist Doldrums

The Communists, meanwhile, are in the doldrums. Their party has lost prestige because it failed to share the outrage felt by most educated Indians toward Communist China in the border dispute. Sharp internal dissension has been evident. One wing, in the interest of international communism, does not want to oppose China on the border issue. Another wing feels the party should be nationalistic. Cleavages have been strengthened by differences of opinion on the rift between Moscow and Peking and actions of the Soviet Union toward Albania. Even many Indian Communists who prefer to side with Moscow, however, have been dismayed by the Russian downgrading of Stalin.

It is believed that internal Communist dissension may have disillusioned many young intellectuals and students who otherwise might have joined the party. This could rob the party of a strong, energetic base for recruitment and organizational work. But it would not necessarily mean that the young intellectuals were disillusioned with Marxism, and would veer from the far left. This is unlikely as long as Congress, national and state governments fail to stem the frustration of unemployed and

underemployed, especially in West Bengal and Kerala, where their numbers are great. Rather, the youngsters are more likely to drift into small extremist groups that could be reconciled with the Communists later.

In Kerala, the Communists were able to gain control of the state government in the 1957 Assembly elections. According to government figures, they polled only 35.28 percent of the popular vote, but the opposition to them was divided. Through triangular contests, they were able to win 60 seats and to swing enough independents to their side to control the 127-seat house. After the Communist government was ousted in July 1959, the Congress and Praja Socialist parties and the Muslim League agreed not to oppose each other in the new elections that were held the following February. So the Communists and Communist-supported independents, who at this time polled 43 percent of the popular vote, were able to win only 29 seats, compared with 63 for Congress and 20 for the Praja Socialists, who formed an uneasy coalition government.

The Kerala experience could be repeated elsewhere in India. That it may not happen right away may be attributed to stronger Congress organizations in other states, relatively lesser economic ills than in Kerala and a loss of Communist prestige. It would be dangerous to surmise, however, that the Indian Communist party has been damaged irreparably by internal dissension and its position on international affairs. Most political observers believe that in the long run the fate of Indian communism will be decided, not by international issues, but by domestic ones. The key issue is whether the Indian economy can develop fast enough within a democratic framework to keep pace with popular demand.

Congress Domination of Parliament

Congress emerged from India's first general election in 1952 with 362 of 489 elective seats in the lower house of Parliament. The Socialist party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja (Farmers-

Workers-People's) party, which later combined to form the Praja Socialists, won 12 and 9 seats, respectively. The Communists won 16; the Jan Sangh, 3; and independents and other parties (including 11 allies of the Communists), 87.

The next general elections, in 1957, produced a similar picture. Congress won 371 out of 494 elective seats (a constitutional amendment of 1956 had increased the size of the house); the Praja Socialists, 19; the Communists, 27; the Jan Sangh, 4; and independents and other parties, 73 (including 2 Communist allies).

Results of the February 1962 elections have been delayed because of snowbound constituencies. At this writing, however, 485 out of the total 494 seats have been declared with the following results: Congress, 353; Praja Socialists, 12; Communists, 29; Jan Sangh, 14; Swatantra, 18; independents and other parties, 59. While Congress's majority remains secure, its candidates received about 2.5 percent fewer votes than in 1957. The chief beneficiary of this trend was the Swatantra party, which, on the basis of incomplete returns, doubled the number of seats it previously held. The Praja Socialists, meanwhile, had their percentage of the votes reduced from 10.4 percent in 1957 to 7.08. The Communists raised their tally from 8.9 to 10.67 percent, and the Jan Sangh, from 5.9 to 6.1 percent.

After Nehru, Who?

Despite the strength of Congress, increasing thought is being given to the day when Nehru will no longer dominate Indian politics. At 72 years of age he seems almost as tireless as ever. He is prime minister, foreign minister, head of the Department of Atomic Energy, chairman of the Planning Commission and head of several committees. No one in India except Gandhi has been so widely known or commands as much respect as Nehru.

Sometimes the prime minister is criticized as being reluctant to delegate power—to give younger men a chance to train for national leadership. "He is like a banyan tree," it is said, "under

which nothing grows." To some extent, this criticism may be just. For many years Nehru has been accustomed to having things his way. He insists that he deplures yes men, yet time and time again he has exerted his power to still critics. On the other hand, there is a strong tendency among his colleagues to leave major decision-making to him.

In recent years Nehru has adamantly refused to name an heir apparent. He may sincerely feel that he is thereby avoiding a power struggle within his party. Or he may feel that no one is worthy of the choice.

In a television interview in Washington last November 5, Nehru said that just by naming a successor he would not necessarily assure an orderly succession. He recalled that Sir Winston Churchill had not fared very well by naming Sir Anthony Eden as his successor as prime minister of Britain. Nehru also has stated repeatedly that an attempt to name India's next prime minister would not be compatible with democracy—that conditions were different when, before independence, Gandhi named him.

In early 1953 there were indications that Nehru might favor Jayaprakash Narayan. The previous autumn, the prime minister had called in Narayan and proposed "cooperation at all levels"—presumably a coalition—between the Praja Socialists, then headed by Narayan, and Congress. But talks that ranged over six months proved abortive. Nehru was believed to feel that he would be unable to reconcile Narayan's sweeping socialistic proposals (with which the prime minister appeared personally to sympathize) with the ideas of conservatives in the Congress party.

To those who watch Indian politics closely, it is clear that there will be an obvious choice to succeed Nehru when he dies or retires. Who the choice will be depends on the timing. Today it would probably be Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, a slight, soft-spoken figure, who is highly respected in the Congress hierarchy though little known outside India. Tomorrow it might be Finance Minister Morarji R. Desai, a stern, moralistic disciplinarian

whose policies and manner have done much to attract Western economic aid. Or it might even be Food and Agriculture Minister Sadashiv K. Patil, the "Jim Farley" of Congress, or Railway Minister Jagjivan Ram, an "untouchable," the only person besides Nehru who has been a minister continuously since the first cabinet. Or it could conceivably be the highly controversial V. K. Krishna Menon, who appears to have gained considerable popularity since Indian troops seized the Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Damão and Diu last December, and who won by a landslide in the February Parliamentary elections.

Among the conclusions that can be drawn from the first 15 years of independent India's politics are the following:

That the die has been cast for democratic government. The only thing likely to uproot it is the failure of economic planning. Because this could fail, however, the potential threat of communism should not be discounted.

That divisive tendencies, though common to any pluralistic society, have perhaps a special significance in India because a large degree of unity is necessary for economic growth.

That while a successor to Nehru should not be difficult to find, the next prime minister will not command the automatic respect that Nehru does. Among those presently in the picture, only the controversial Krishna Menon would be able to maintain India's prominence in international councils—albeit probably at the expense of friendship with the West

Economic Development

INDIA IS SAID TO AIM AT A "SOCIALIST PATTERN of society." This is defined as a mixed economy, with a growing state-owned sector but also with ample room for private enterprise. It aims at progressively rapid production to raise living standards and promote exports. It means equality of opportunity and equitable distribution of national wealth. It means cooperation in agriculture and in the development of rural industry.

Even within this framework, however, nearly 90 percent of Indian enterprise, including virtually all farming, is in private hands today. Such enterprise furnishes more than 90 percent of the national income, but this figure will decrease as planned development progresses.

India's economic philosophy represents primarily the thinking of Nehru, but it has been strongly influenced by Gandhi, too. In his youth, Nehru studied the works of the Fabian socialists of Britain, who opposed the revolutionary theory of Marx but believed that social reforms and socialistic "permeation" of existing political institutions would bring about the natural development of socialism. Nehru began expressing socialist views in the 1920's. During the next decade, he became intellectually attracted to Marxism, although he firmly rejected the totalitarianism of communism. He was an admirer of the late Professor Harold J. Laski, a leading Fabian socialist who became chairman of the British Labor party. Many leaders of contemporary India, notably

Krishna Menon, were strongly influenced by Laski through study under him at the London School of Economics, through hearing him lecture or through reading his books.

Nehru insisted that Indian freedom should entail the abolition of vested economic interests. He advocated the most rapid transformation possible into a socialist democracy. He urged an industrial and agrarian revolution through the application of the latest methods of science and technology.

Gandhi's Social Justice

Gandhi, meanwhile, sought social justice but rejected socialism. He distrusted the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of either the state or a few private owners. He propounded a "theory of trusteeship"—in which the privileged classes should hold their wealth as trustees of the people as a whole. He believed in social justice through conversion, not coercion.

"I feel," he wrote, "that our progress towards the goal will be in the exact proportion to the purity of our means."

Gandhi thought that socialists believed in violence, which he rejected. He felt that they were primarily concerned with man's material progress, while he believed in spiritual improvement through the rejection of desire.

Gandhi's approach to revitalizing India was through the 550,000 villages, which claim more than 82 percent of the country's population. He encouraged rural uplift through education, self-sacrifice and self-help—through a change of attitudes. He promoted village handicrafts and the use of homespun goods for several reasons. One was his desire, during the struggle for independence, to stem the import of British textiles, which he felt were destroying the livelihood of village craftsmen. Another reason was his desire to discourage migration to the cities. Gandhi did not oppose industrialization as such; in fact, he encouraged the construction of factories in rural India. But he opposed the human misery of industrial cities, the demoralizing effect that migration had on villages and the separation of workers from their families.

To many economists, Gandhi's views were archaic and would never have permitted India to transform her economy rapidly enough to preserve democracy. Yet national planners have incorporated Gandhian economics in their programs for rural development.

The Three Five-Year Plans


In March 1950, a six-member Planning Commission was established, with Nehru as chairman. Its brief was to prepare a plan for the "most effective and balanced utilization of the country's resources."

The draft outline of India's First Five-Year Plan appeared in July 1951. The final draft was not approved by Parliament, however, until December 1952. Meanwhile, the outline underwent searching scrutiny by political parties, the press, industry, labor, professional men and Parliament. The total investment in the first plan was the equivalent of \$7,896,000,000, according to Planning Commission figures. The major stress was on programs designed to build India's agricultural potential. Priority was given to land reform, the establishment of a coordinated rural development program and the streamlining of public administration. Thus, of the \$4,116,000,000 outlay in the public sector, 31 percent was spent on agriculture, community development and irrigation. Industries and mining received only 4 percent.


Planning Commission figures place the total investment of the 1956-61 second plan at the equivalent of \$16.17 billion and the public sector outlay at \$9.66 billion. The share given to industrial development, largely for basic and heavy industries, increased to 20 percent of the total outlay, the same as the total given to agriculture, community development and irrigation. In both plans, transport and communications received high priority—27 percent of the first-plan outlay and 28 percent of the second. Social services and miscellaneous items declined from 23 percent of the outlay to 18 percent.

Implementation of the third plan began April 1, 1961 although

Tar distillation plant at
the Bhilai steel mill,
financed by the ▶
Soviet Union



Press Information Bureau, ▶
Government of India



Construction of the Bhakra Dam
was commenced, before
◀ independence, by the British,
and was later included in
the First Five-Year Plan

The Ford Foundation (William R. Simmons



A cloth mill in
Delhi. The Ford
Foundation is
helping to finance ▶
research to
improve
industrial

the final 774-page draft was not approved by Parliament until last August. It calls for a total expenditure of the equivalent of \$24.36 billion (\$21.84 billion in investment plus \$2.52 billion in current outlay for staff, subsidies, etc.). Of the total public sector outlay of \$15.75 billion, the share of industry and mining will again be 20 percent, but that of agriculture, community development and irrigation will increase to 23 percent. Transport and communications are earmarked for 20 percent of the outlay and social services and miscellaneous items 17 percent.

Focus on Agriculture

According to the final draft of the third plan, "the first priority necessarily belongs to agriculture." The commission adds:

"Experience in the first two plans, and especially in the second, has shown that the rate of growth in agricultural production is one of the main limiting factors in the progress of the Indian economy. Agricultural production has, therefore, to be increased to the largest extent feasible, and adequate resources have to be provided under the third plan for realizing the agricultural targets. The rural economy has to be diversified and the proportion of the population dependent on agriculture, gradually diminished. These are essential aims if the incomes and levels of living of the rural population are to rise steadily to keep pace with incomes in other sectors."

Of the total investment in the third plan, the equivalent of \$8.61 billion, or 35 percent, is expected in the private sector. In the second plan, the private sector provided 40 percent of the total investment. It provided 47 percent in the first plan. To put the picture in its proper perspective, however, it should be realized that while the percentage share of the private sector has decreased, the sum earmarked for private investment in the third plan is not far below the total amount (\$10.29 billion) that was invested in the private sector in the first two plans.

The deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, Gulzarilal

Nanda, Minister of Labor and Employment and Planning, is in charge of over-all coordination of the third plan.

At the top of the Indian planning structure is the Cabinet, which makes broad policy decisions. Beneath it is the nine-year-old National Development Council, which consists of the prime minister, all state chief ministers and members of the Planning Commission. Beneath the Development Council are the Planning Commission and state planning agencies. Each state agency sends proposals for local projects to the commission and administers programs within its territory. The commission and its host of experts conduct research and draft development programs. Each commission member is responsible for certain areas. Decisions are made after extensive and prolonged discussion on all levels of official and public opinion.

India's economic programs constitute the greatest attempt at planned development ever undertaken in a democratic society. Each five-year plan is intimately related to the others and is part of a long-range program to attain a self-reliant, self-generating economy as soon as possible. Data are now being collected for the preparation of an over-all program to guide the country until 1976, the end of the fifth-plan period. This program will emphasize the interdependence of agriculture and industry, economic and social development, national and regional development and the mobilization of domestic and external resources.

Economic Achievements and Hopes

What has planning accomplished? Using 1949-50 as the base year of 100, the Planning Commission calculates that the agricultural production index had increased to 141 by 1960-61. The industrial production index had risen to 194 from the 100 base year of 1950-51. Commission figures show that school enrollment rose 85 percent in the decade beginning 1950-51, national income rose 42 percent at current prices and per capita income increased from \$59.64 a year to \$69.30.

The third plan, according to the Planning Commission, hopes to achieve self-sufficiency in food grains. It hopes to expand industry at a rate that, a decade from now, will permit further growth, mainly with domestic resources rather than external aid. It hopes national income will increase more than 5 percent annually and that per capita income will rise by 1966 to about 17 percent above its present level. It hopes to make educational facilities available to all Indians between 6 and 11 years old. Because of difficulties, however, in convincing some parents of the value of sending boys to school instead of to work, and of educating girls, the Planning Commission expects only about 76 percent in this age group to be in school by the end of the third plan.


To reach the goals of the third plan means even greater austerity for a people who already feel themselves among the most deprived of human beings. It means a rise in indirect taxation (direct taxes have already been pushed almost as far as economists think feasible). It means that many products of new industries will not go to Indians, but will be earmarked for export in an effort to raise foreign exchange and, ultimately, to pay off external loans.

The third plan calls for \$5,733,000,000 in foreign aid. This would include \$4,263,000,000 for imports of capital goods and equipment, \$420,000,000 for components and other products to increase the output of capital goods and \$1,050,000,000 to refinance maturing obligations. The outlook for raising it is bright. A consortium organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) has promised \$2,286,000,000 for the first two years, including \$1,045,000,000 from the United States government. Credits totaling \$640.5 million have been promised by Communist countries and \$766.5 million in foreign aid is left over from the second plan. The government also hopes to attract at least \$630 million in private foreign investment, mostly from the United States.

What has economic planning meant to the seven Indians out

Acharya Vinoba Bhave,
the "walking saint,"
addressing a
gathering about his
land-gift program ►

Press Information Bureau,
Government of India



of ten who are directly dependent upon the land? Has the lot of the individual farmer improved?

Impact on Peasant Welfare

Most states have set ceilings on landholdings, but these vary widely according to local conditions. Attempts have been made to encourage consolidation of holdings and to revise inheritance laws so as to prevent fragmentation, but progress has been slow.

In January 1959 the Congress party expressed itself in favor of joint cooperative farming. This has been strongly resisted, however, on the ground that it is contrary to tradition and threatens individual rights.

'Land Gift' Movement

Land reform has been assisted by a voluntary movement called *Bhoodan*, or land gift. It was started in April 1951 by Acharya Vinoba Bhave, a disciple of Gandhi. Bhave, 66, a thin bespectacled ascetic, has walked thousands of miles seeking voluntary donations of one-sixth of an owner's land for distribution among the

landless. The movement arose from his concern that villagers might turn to communism if they could not get land nonviolently. His main objective, Bhave is quoted as having said, is to "propagate the right thought by which social and economic maladjustments can be corrected without serious conflicts." He asserted:

"In a just and equitable order of society, land must belong to all. That is why we do not beg for gifts but demand a share to which the poor are rightly entitled."

Bhave has widened the movement to include *Gramdam*, the donation of entire villages so that land may belong to a community as a whole. His over-all target is 50 million acres—enough to provide some cultivable land to every rural family. By August 1960, the latest date for which figures are available, he had collected 4,411,191 acres and 4,643 villages, and had distributed 872,609 acres.

Community Development

A cornerstone of rural uplift is the Community Development Program. It was formally inaugurated on October 2, 1952 (Gandhi's 83rd birth anniversary) in 55 project areas of about 500 square miles each throughout the country. It is expected to cover all rural India by October 1963. The objective is "to develop self-reliance in the individual and initiative in the village community." The government offers technical and financial help. Agriculture receives the highest priority in a vital struggle to increase food output. Lesser emphasis is placed on communications, housing, health and sanitation, education, women's and children's welfare, and cottage and small-scale industries.

The objective, however, has not been fulfilled and criticism is widespread. In 1957, five years after the program began, Surendra Kumar Dey, minister for Community Development and Cooperation, admitted in Parliament that "in getting the peoples' representatives into the program, in getting them involved, I would say we have failed."

Field studies suggest that the principal shortcoming is the failure to "evoke local interest and excite local initiative" in doing something about immediate development needs.

Community Initiative


A major step to correct the faults was taken in 1959 with the initial implementation of a concept called *Panchayati Raj*, literally "government by village councils," in conjunction with the Community Development Program. It involves decentralization of authority—the delegation of responsibility, power and resources to representative grass-roots institutions that plan and implement development programs. The basic institutions are the *panchayat* (village council), the school and the cooperative society.

Panchayati Raj has been fully instituted in seven states and partly instituted in most others. In most states, panchayat members are directly elected by secret ballot. It is believed that on this level even an illiterate voter can choose intelligently, for the panchayat area is small enough so that he will personally know and be able to judge the candidates. The hope is to prevent voting on party or caste lines or for vested interests.

Panchayats are usually entitled to a share of land revenue. They are empowered to levy taxes such as on houses, professions, property and vehicles. They can gain income from such enterprises as cattle ponds, markets and slaughterhouses and the reclamation of wasteland. Officials train and advise panchayat members but want them to take the initiative and responsibility for local development. The accent is on self-help—for example, to get a panchayat itself to initiate, plan, finance and marshal the labor for construction of a road or minor irrigation project, seeking official advice but without waiting for the government to do everything. Before Panchayati Raj, village lethargy was deep because self-help for the good of the community was virtually unknown and because government plans often became hopelessly snarled in red tape.


It is too early to assess accurately the impact of Panchayati Raj.

INDIA — POLITICAL BOUNDARIES AND ECONOMIC I



SOURCES

- | | | |
|----------|------------------|----------------------------|
| ✂ WHEAT | 🍷 SUGAR | 🎬 FILM INDUSTRY |
| 🌾 RICE | 🧵 TEXTILES | ⬆ COAL |
| 🍵 TEA | 🌳 RUBBER | 🏭 STEEL MILLS |
| 🌱 COTTON | 📄 PAPER PRODUCTS | 🪄 IRON ORE |
| | | ⬆ MANGANESE |
| | | 🚚 TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT |
| | | ⬆ PETROLEUM |
| | | 🏠 GOLD |
| | | ⚡ ELECTRIC POWER |



Many prominent Indians, such as Dey and Narayan, are convinced that there can be no significant economic changes in rural India until a new political structure has been created. But preliminary studies have shown that in many areas panchayats still lack the initiative and responsibility for development. The results of some panchayat elections under the new system showed little change from the existing balance of power.


In a recent year-long survey of the impact of planned development on rural India, Mrs. Kusum Nair, a journalist, found that land-reform legislation often had loopholes that defeated its purpose. She found that farmers often lived in a quagmire of superstition, tradition and limited aspirations. She quoted from an official report in Mysore which said:

"We carry manures and improved seeds in a trailer and offer to deliver them right to the doorstep to induce these cultivators to use them. We offer them loans to buy the seeds and manures. We go to their fields and offer to let in the water for them [from irrigation projects]. We request them to try it out first in two acres only if they are not convinced. They could quadruple their yields if they would only take our advice and at least experiment. Still they are not coming forward."

Prevailing expert opinion appears to be that, despite alarming backwardness in some areas, rural India offers hope. In all under-developed countries, rural change is and always has been slow. But the quickest possible change is vital to meet a steadily mounting demand in India for food and fibres.

Industrial Potentials

On the industrial side of Indian development, however, change has been tremendous. India has the world's largest known deposits of iron ore and vast coal reserves, the third largest reserve of manganese, four-fifths of the world's mica, large deposits of thorium (a source of atomic power) and ample bauxite, gypsum, chrome, lime, gold, fire-clay, salt and feldspar.




First meeting of the National Development Council, held in New Delhi, November 8, 1952. The prime minister, standing behind microphone, chief ministers of the states and members of the Planning Commission were present.



A panchayat meeting in progress at Ramnagar Panchayat Ghar

Prime Minister Nehru, chatting with the inmates of the hospital in Jawahar Nagar, a township for refugees in Ludhiana ▶



The Planning Commission, however, notes a deficiency in copper, lead and zinc. It says that there are no workable deposits of tin, nickel, molybdenum and elemental sulphur. It notes a critical shortage of oil, although it sees hope in new discoveries and continuing exploration.

The hydroelectric power potential of India is enormous. The labor supply is almost unlimited, although scientific, technical and managerial skills are scarce. Transport is wholly inadequate. The 109-year-old railroad system, with a total of 35,213 miles last year, is the largest in Asia. But it is burdened by insufficient and over-age rolling stock and track. Also, rail development requires coordination with the construction of roads and ports to meet increasingly heavy demand.

India was by no means without industry in 1947. It was a major producer of cotton and jute fabrics. It also made steel, sugar, cement, paper and many other items. The accent, however, was on consumer goods. With the advent of independence, India found itself badly in need of basic industries.

Progress in Industrial Development

India's industrial policy since 1948 has emphasized essential production. Industrial output has almost doubled since then and is expected to increase 70 percent more by 1966.

In industry, much more than in agriculture, the government has been able to apply measures to attain a "socialist pattern of society." The development of public utilities and industries of basic and strategic importance has, with a few exceptions, been reserved to the state—with the concession that existing private industries would not be nationalized and that the rules could be relaxed if such a move were considered vital to the economy. Among such industries are private iron and steel mills and coal mines. Some essential fields, such as the production of fertilizers, machine tools, chemicals and drugs, are open to private enterprise but will be progressively state-owned. Other industries will normally be left to the private sector but also will be open to the state.

The government believes that flourishing private enterprise will contribute to the country's welfare. It acknowledges that without private enterprise India would not have made the tremendous industrial gains of recent years. But it insists that there should be as broad a distribution of wealth as possible and the most prudent possible use of India's scarce financial resources and technical skills. Through a licensing system, the government aims at a balanced development of large and small industries and a balanced geographical distribution.

Incentives to Small Industries

Considerable incentive has been given to small-scale industry. The government provides loans, buildings and technical assistance. The result has been an upsurge in the production of such items as bicycles, sewing machines, plastics and light engineering goods.

In an assessment of Indian industrial progress and plans, several critical problems and questions arise. One is whether coordinated transport facilities can be developed rapidly enough to meet growing industrial demands. Another is whether training programs can rapidly turn out sufficient technical and managerial personnel. Another is whether the exploitation of vital natural resources can keep pace with demand. Still another is whether bureaucratic red tape can be satisfactorily slashed. Yet another is whether a broad-based class of industrial entrepreneurs can be developed from among businessmen who (with a few notable exceptions, such as the Tatas and Birlas) have traditionally been traders, unaccustomed to long-term investment.

And a persistent question is whether India will be able to maintain a rate of industrial progress which, so far—in output, at least—outpaces that in Red China. Available information indicates that the gap has narrowed since 1959.

Social Change

MUCH MORE THAN STATISTICS IS NECESSARY to know and understand how India has changed.

"If you want to know India," foreigners are often advised, "you must go to the villages. You won't find the real India in New Delhi, Calcutta or Bombay."

The truth is that there are two distinct Indias, urban and rural, each reasonably independent of the other. This, perhaps, is India's key problem, the key problem of any economy that is not yet viable and self-generating. Urban and rural India have yet to learn how to complement each other.

In urban India the changes of the last 15 years are striking—new office buildings and homes, new factories, new cars and new shops with new goods. Cities and towns have grown enormously. Of the big cities, only Calcutta, because of a complexity of special social and economic problems, shows marked signs of retrogression. Whether the lot of the average city dweller has improved or worsened, however, is open to question, but his habits and his outlook have without doubt been affected by the changes about him.

Change in Village India

In rural India one must look closer, often beneath the surface, to find change. Outwardly most villages are what they were 15 years ago—suffocating with dust in the summer, chilly and ill-sheltered in the winter and mired in mud during the monsoon. Infants are naked or in rags, their bellies puffed by malnutrition, their skin often covered with sores. Sanitation is primitive or nonexistent; enteric, pulmonary and venereal diseases are rampant.

Yet malaria, once the biggest killer, now cripples very few except those in whom it has been recurrent for years. The infant mortality rate has fallen sharply, for medical care and advice, though still extremely inadequate and sometimes rejected by those who could be helped the most, have spread widely. New roads, though often adequate only for oxcarts and pedestrians and for jeeps in fair weather, have broadened horizons. And more children are learning to read.

Limitations of Caste

One of the biggest obstacles to rural progress is caste. The age-old caste system divides Hindus into four broad socio-occupational groups. At the top are the *Brahmins*, the traditional priests and intellectual leaders; next the *Kshatriyas*, the warriors and rulers; then the *Vaisyas*, the traders and merchants, and finally the *Sudras*, who serve the three others. Beneath this structure are the outcastes, or untouchables.

A caste system is not unique to India. Rigid stratifications of society have existed in other nonindustrial societies, such as medieval Europe. In India, however, it has persisted more than in other countries. It dominates Indian social life, manners, morals and thought. The essential duty of a member of a caste is to follow the customs of his group, especially in relation to diet and marriage. In rural India, caste often determines who will man the plows, who will extend credit, who will be the

blacksmith, who will sell manufactured goods, who will dispose of refuse and, in many cases, who will own the land.

Plight of the 'Untouchables'

The greatest blight on Indian society, however, has been untouchability. According to *The Oxford History of India*, the ancient Hindu writers described those who came to be called untouchables as half-wild tribesmen and such members of communities as scavengers, whose duties were unclean. The origin of untouchability, like the origin of the caste system, is unclear. It probably stems from ancient invasions of the subcontinent and the work that the conquerors forced upon the conquered. It may have been based on color, but many historians doubt this.

The untouchable has been the scavenger, the coolie, the tanner and shoemaker, the poorest of sharecroppers. His life has been plagued by discrimination. He has traditionally been barred from sharing the food of a caste Hindu, even from using the same well. Many temples have prohibited his entry. Many a Brahmin, even today, will return home to bathe if an untouchable should accidentally brush against him in a crowd.

The Nehru government—in fact, probably the majority of educated Indians—abhors untouchability. In an unceasing fight against it, Gandhi named the victims *Harijans*, or children of God. But neither sweeping legislation nor strong moral pressure has been sufficient to enlighten most Indians—those who live in a dark world of tradition, superstition and ignorance.

The Constitution outlaws discrimination against *Harijans*. It reserves places for them and aboriginal tribesmen in educational institutions, government employment and elective office. As a result of this, Jagjivan Ram has become Union Railway minister and Damodaram Sanjivaiah has become chief minister of Andhra Pradesh. If not for the safeguards, both would probably be illiterate nobodies.

Legal and moral pressure have opened many Hindu temples to *Harijans*. In many villages, all inhabitants now use the same wells.

In rural India, however (and to a lesser extent in the cities), caste still governs social behavior. Among caste Hindus, it plays a major role in determining how they vote. Political organizations have been torn asunder because of squabbles based on caste.

Legislating for Equality

Within the last decade, legislation has attempted to reform other aspects of Hindu society besides the caste system. Child marriages, polygamy and the age-old dowry system have been outlawed. Married couples can now legally separate or obtain an annulment or divorce. Women have been given inheritance rights in equal degree with men.

As with untouchability, however, experience has shown that legislation alone cannot uproot long-standing customs. For example, unless a party to a dowry goes to court, it may be difficult to convict one who violates the law. Many fathers continue voluntarily to bankrupt themselves to provide dowries for their daughters simply because that is what their families have done for generations and because social prestige is involved.

The government hopes that legislation will provide the impetus for the gradual elimination of social evils. It hopes laws will be augmented by strong moral pressure which will develop through education.

In the cities, social progress has been relatively much faster than in the villages—as it has been in most countries. Urban congestion, the pressures of industrialization, the development of mobility of labor, have left much less room for social barriers than the relatively static, traditional society of rural India. Industrial employees are selected principally on the basis of skill, not social background. In government and industrial housing developments, salary is the major factor that determines who lives next to whom. In factory cafeterias, the attraction of low-cost, nutritious meals helps one to forget that the chef and the other men on the bench may not be of one's caste.

Industrialization has made many persons aware that untoucha-

bility and other social backwardness have little relevance to modern life. But progress, even in urban India, is slow.

Importance of Education

In so many aspects of Indian development, education appears to be the key to progress. Substantial gains have been made, such as a rise in the literacy rate in the last decade from 16.6 to 23.7 percent. But the problem involves much more than teaching the masses to read, write and do simple arithmetic. It means teaching those things that can best benefit the individual, the village and the country.

Even when primary education becomes free and compulsory, most children will get no more than that. It will be many years before the government will be able to afford to give them secondary schooling. It may be even longer before many needy families will willingly send adolescents to school rather than to work. And it may be still longer before most fathers are convinced that their daughters deserve as much education as sons.


Besides offering educational facilities to all Indians between 6 and 11 years old, The Third Five-Year Plan aims at improving and extending the teaching of science in secondary schools and colleges, developing vocational and technical education and expanding and improving teacher-training facilities. It hopes to reduce substantially the disparities between schooling offered girls and boys. Extensive reorganization of undergraduate, post-graduate and research programs is planned.

"At all stages of education," the plan says, "the aim must be to develop both skill and knowledge and a creative outlook, a feeling of national unity which stands above region, caste and language, and an understanding of common interests and obligations."

The aim, even in primary education, is to cram as much as possible into a short time. Children must be taught the rudiments of sanitation and health habits. They must develop practical skills. They must be taught something about their country—it

Community Development

A small pottery plant
in Calcutta, which is
benefiting from The
Ford Foundation and
Stanford Research
Institute aid to the
government of India ▶



The Ford Foundation (William R. Simmo




Information Services of India

▲
The traditional hand loom
of the north Indian villager.
With it, a worker can earn
up to 50 cents a day—a
better income than a farm
laborer's.

A village aid worker conducts
an adult education class
in south India

▼
The Ford Foundation (William R. Simmo



diverse peoples, its history, its aspirations. They must be encouraged to help themselves.

Such lessons are pressed even harder in India's growing adult education programs. To call village night schools "literacy classes" is a misnomer. They really are classes in broad personal enlightenment and civic responsibility. They try to replace ignorance, superstition and narrow-mindedness with a new way of thought.

In secondary education, the trend is toward greater specialization, especially toward the development of scientific and technical skills. There are few jobs for high-school graduates with general knowledge, but broad opportunities for those trained in agriculture and technology. A major problem, however, is to convince graduates that farming and mechanical labor are not beneath their dignity.

In 1958-59, the last year for which figures are available, India had 53,302 secondary schools with 471,207 teachers—about 56 percent higher than the figures for 1950. Enrollment, 14,078,334 in 1958-59, had nearly tripled.

Higher Education

On the university level the problems are manifold and complicated. India has 43 universities with a total enrollment of about 900,000. A few do their own teaching. Most, however, do not teach undergraduates, but set the curricula and examinations for colleges affiliated to them.

In Indian colleges, classes are usually overcrowded, teaching is poor and equipment is inadequate and inferior. Most teachers are grossly underpaid and have schedules that permit them little time for independent research. Faculties and student bodies are ridden with politics. Indiscipline is rampant.

In most colleges, study means memorizing lecture notes and sections of textbooks—often inferior books written by teachers who prescribe them for their own students. A single examination in each course at the end of the academic year determines a student's

grade. More often than not, a degree proves to be merely a license to a frustrating quest for a clerical job. Although many colleges attempt to teach physics, chemistry and engineering, few have the staff and laboratory facilities to provide adequate instruction for India's growing needs.

Qualified guidance for students is virtually unavailable in India. Also, most colleges base admissions strictly on the results of final secondary-school exams. This often leads to faulty selection of both students and courses of study.

Comparing India with China, Wilfred Malenbaum says that in 1950 in the age group of 6-14, almost one-third of the Indians were in school but only 22.5 percent of the Chinese. By 1959, however, he says, the percentages had changed to 45 for India and almost 60 for China. Malenbaum adds:

"At the other end of the educational process, China in 1955 was training annually 30.9 engineers and 11.2 medical doctors per million persons in its population. Comparable figures for India were 18.4 and 8.1 respectively. Continuation of these rates would, within 10 to 20 years, reverse the more advanced position which India had in these professional fields in 1955."

Problems of Sheer Numbers

Difficulties in education in India (and in China), like those in agriculture and industry, reflect perhaps the biggest problem of all—too many people for too few of the necessities of life. The population was estimated in provisional official results of the 1961 census at 438 million (UN estimate based on this census was 434.8 million). Based on their figure, the Planning Commission estimates a population of 625 million in 1976. The rise of about 75 million between 1951 and 1961 (72 million according to the UN) was nearly as large as that in the *two* preceding decades. According to compilations of Dr. C. Chandrasekaran, director of the Demographic Training and Research Centre of Bombay, India's current birth rate is estimated at 40 and the death rate at 18, resulting in a natural increase of 2.2 percent a

year (according to UN, 1.3 percent). Life expectancy has increased from 32 years in the 1940's to 47.5 years today.

✓“The increase in food production and national income achieved during the [first] two five-year plans,” says Dr. Chandrasekaran, “has hardly led to any appreciable improvement in the living standards of the people.”

✓ The Planning Commission has stated that “the objective of stabilizing the growth of population over a reasonable period must be at the very center of planned development.” In this context, about \$100 million has been allocated for birth control in the third plan, or about ten times as much as the second-plan outlay. This will be spent on educational programs, provision of services, training of aides, as well as supplies and research.

✓ While stressing a need for birth control, Prime Minister Nehru has cautioned (in a CBS telecast on November 11, 1959) that it should not be given top priority. “Food must get top priority,” he asserted. “Some people imagine that we will solve India's problems by family planning. I do not agree. It is a very important factor, but we have to advance all along the line.”

India and World Affairs

ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1946, NEARLY A YEAR before India became independent, Nehru addressed his people as vice-president of the viceroy's executive council, or *de facto* prime minister. His remarks contained the keynote of a foreign policy that still guides his country today.

"We propose, as far as possible," Nehru declared, "to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale."

He made it clear, however, that by no means would he watch idly as other countries determined the world's fate.

"India is on the move," he said, "and the old order passes. Too long have we been passive spectators of events, the playthings of others. The initiative comes to our people now and we shall make the history of our choice."

Nehru's World Role

The growth of a powerful voice in world councils for underdeveloped India is partly a result of the country's size but largely the result of Nehru's personal statesmanship. He has held top office longer than most other heads of government. He is intellectually on the top rung of Asian and African statesmanship. He combines the subtleties of Eastern thought with the pragmatism

and polish of the best Western education (Harrow and Cambridge).

He has consistently been his own foreign minister. His foreign policy has some strong critics within India, but it commands proportionately greater mass support than that of most governments in their own countries. He invariably has the final say in India.

Nonalignment has been a difficult concept for many Westerners to accept. Much to Nehru's distaste, it is often interpreted to be synonymous with neutralism—a negative, middle-of-the-road reluctance to distinguish between right and wrong, an eagerness to benefit from all sides. To many Americans, the middle of the road seems to shift to the left and further from the United States when Soviet actions, such as last summer's resumption of nuclear tests, are extreme.


Policy of 'Nonalignment'

Nehru firmly rejects this view. He describes neutralism (in an interview with the writer on January 26) as a wartime word. He considers nonalignment, however, to be a positive policy in which a country acts independently and judges each issue on merit. He feels that India can contribute to world peace by trying to bring opposing sides together. He professes that this cannot be accomplished by denunciation, although Americans note that he and his representatives have sometimes vociferously criticized the West.

To understand Indian policy, perhaps one should view it from the standpoint of self-interest. Indian economic development depends heavily upon external aid and, therefore, needs world peace. The biggest share of this aid comes from the United States, so India wants American friendship. The Russians have given India not only economic aid, but also political support in its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. And New Delhi notes that Moscow has not seemed to side with Peking in the India-China border dispute. This has indirectly strengthened the Indian stand.

Nehru points out that his people's view of the world is condi-

Indian troops
enter Goa ►



Press Information Bureau, Government of Ind

tioned by geographical, historical and emotional factors that are different from those that condition the West. He cites ancient Indian cultural and trade contacts with other parts of Asia, contacts that were cut off during the British rule.

“With the coming of independence,” he said in a speech last November 2, “automatically we reopened them and we pick up old threads again and are developing those contacts. . . . We feel more intimately with regard to them than we may feel about something in America or Europe, although from the world point of view, what happens in America or Europe may be more important.”

India on Colonialism

Nehru staunchly denies that his use of force to wrest the enclaves of Goa, Damão and Diu from Portuguese rule was inconsistent with his preaching of peaceful methods. He notes that New Delhi had tried repeatedly in vain to negotiate with Lisbon for the transfer of Portuguese possessions on the Indian subcontinent. He admits, however, that the dispatch of the Indian army to the enclaves may have been inconsistent with Gandhi's

belief in nonviolence (although he expressed a feeling that the mahatma would have approved of the action).

"I wonder how many of you remember," the prime minister said at a news conference in New Delhi last December 28, ten days after the action in Goa, "that in the early days of the last war . . . Mr. Gandhi resigned from the Congress Working Committee . . . because [it] could not accept his interpretation of nonviolence as a policy for the future in India when India was free. We were all for peaceful methods in our movement. But he said you must now decide that in that future . . . you must adhere to nonviolence which meant keeping no armies, no air force, no nothing, hardly a police force. That was his idea of nonviolence.

"And as much as we admired Mr. Gandhi and believed in his movement, peaceful nonviolent movement, we thought we could not commit the future India to that. We would have liked to do so but we just could not responsibly say so, because it depends upon so many factors, world factors, factors of our own people."

Nehru recalled that Gandhi had "definitely and clearly approved" of Indian military intervention in Kashmir in late 1947. He said Gandhi had commended Polish resistance against Hitler in 1939.

"Holding to nonviolence," Nehru commented, "his nonviolence was more of the mind and thought—also of action—but more than that. He said, if you have a dagger in your heart, pull it out and use it and not keep it in your mind and heart."

Many Westerners feel that Nehru's post-Goa comments merely reflected a searching for an excuse to justify action that, had it been committed by another country, India would have condemned. They feel that if he thinks he can justify the use of force to settle some international disputes, he should have expressed such a view long ago in other issues, rather than attempt to pass moral judgment in a supposed quest to avoid violence.

The biggest factor that induced India to use force against the Portuguese was probably an overwhelming frustration that resulted from failure to oust them peacefully. To most Indians the

Portuguese enclaves represented the last vestiges of an archaic colonialism that had lived far beyond its time. Some commentators feel that the United States, which was emotionally upset by the military take over, should have used its influence long before to try to persuade Lisbon to consider peaceful change.

Another factor that probably helped to induce India was a threatened weakening of its prestige in Asian and African affairs. India's peaceful approach (although it had lent more than 5,800 troops and planes and equipment to the UN force in the Congo and has troops with the UN in Gaza) placed it out of step with the militantly anticolonial clamor in parts of Africa. To many African freedom fighters, who have seen repression that was rarely known in India, the New Delhi approach was difficult to accept.

United States-Indian Relations

The United States had little political contact with India before World War II. In wartime talks with Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt pressed strongly for Indian freedom. Meanwhile, many Americans had become impressed with the methods of Gandhi, particularly his fasts of penitence against what he considered wrong.

Since 1947, relations between India and the United States have been subject to strong vicissitudes. Nehru first visited the United States in October 1949, primarily to seek economic aid, although his pride prevented him from begging for it. According to Michael Brecher, a recent biographer of Nehru, the prime minister developed "a thinly disguised contempt for American 'materialism'." He is believed to have been greatly annoyed by having been told by a prominent American businessman at a dinner in Nehru's honor:

"You know, Mr. Prime Minister, around this table are seated leaders of corporations worth \$20 billion."

Although India had received \$39.9 million in United States aid during 1946-48, Nehru was reluctant to accept conditions which the American Congress expected. The next United States

agreement to give economic aid to India, a \$189.7 million loan to purchase 2 million tons of surplus wheat, was delayed until June 1951, after thousands of persons had died in a famine. The agreement followed a sharp congressional debate. Some persons say, however, that India made no real case for aid.

The first sharp rift between New Delhi and Washington occurred during the Korean war. India acknowledged that the initial attack was North Korean aggression, but would contribute only a medical unit, not combat troops, to the UN force. Later India strongly opposed General Douglas MacArthur's decision to send troops across the 38th parallel and to bomb Yalu river power plants. India warned (accurately) that this would draw the Chinese Communists into the war.

New Delhi argued vigorously, meanwhile, for the admission of Communist China into the UN and opposed American support of the French in the Indochina war.

A low point in relations was reached in 1954, when the United States agreed to give military aid to Pakistan. Washington assured New Delhi that such aid could not legitimately be used against India. Many Indians were convinced, however, that Pakistan had designs against them—that this, not a threat of Communist aggression, was the reason behind United States military aid. They felt that the United States, even if it wanted to, could not prevent Pakistan from misusing the aid.

India virulently opposed the formation, in 1954, of the South-east Asia Treaty Organization and the conclusion five months later of the Baghdad pact, now the Central Treaty Organization. Nehru felt virtually no rapport with the late John Foster Dulles, then United States Secretary of State, who in turn had no respect for nonalignment as a national policy.

Recent Developments

Relations improved slightly in 1956. New Delhi welcomed United States displeasure with the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, although the Indian reaction was tempered by reports

that American arms had been used by the Anglo-French forces. Americans, meanwhile, were aroused by India's vacillating attitude toward Soviet repression in Hungary, especially by a pro-Soviet vote by V. K. Krishna Menon of India in the UN.

In 1958, the dispatch of American forces to Lebanon irked India sorely. Since then, however, there have been no deep rifts, although there have been differences of approach on such problems as Berlin, nuclear testing and renewed tension in Indochina. Last year, Indians assailed the United States-sponsored invasion of Cuba, and Americans were conversely aroused by the Indian invasion of Goa. But both developments, as seen in India, were relative pinpricks in an era of cordiality.

There appear to be two major reasons for this cordiality. While New Delhi has refused to accept any aid with strings attached, it is grateful for the equivalent of slightly more than \$4 billion in loans and grants that the United States government has committed to the Indian economy. This aid has been distributed over many fields. Unlike Soviet-aided projects, no single loan or grant has made such visible impact itself, but the total volume has been so great that the aid has been felt in many fields—such as education, health, industrial development, power generation and rural uplift. Since 1957, when the annual volume of United States aid increased sharply, Indians have come to realize how vital it is to their economic planning. The Nehru government has grown much more cautious in criticizing the United States. While it shuns any political or military link with the United States, it is reluctant to take any action it fears might jeopardize American aid. Many Indians have expressed deep concern that the Goa episode may plague them when the United States Congress debates foreign aid this year.

The other reason is the increasing attention that the United States government has paid India's views since the death in May 1959 of Dulles. Even though Washington sometimes disagrees sharply with New Delhi, it appears to feel that Nehru's views should be considered carefully in international decisions. This

approach gathered momentum when President Dwight D. Eisenhower visited New Delhi in December 1959. The Indians accorded him a tumultuous welcome. This mood gathered more momentum in the first year of the Kennedy Administration through several exchanges of personal messages between the President and prime minister, visits to New Delhi by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, W. Averell Harriman (then ambassador-at-large) and others, and the appointment of John Kenneth Galbraith, a close friend and adviser of the President, as ambassador to India. Nehru is understood to have got along extremely well with Kennedy in Washington last November, something that could not be said of his personal contacts with Presidents Eisenhower and Truman.

Many Indians feel that nonalignment has come to be respected in Washington. This feeling may not be completely justified, but it pleases them. They have welcomed the firm Kennedy position against colonialism (although they feel there was some retrogression in the uproar over Goa). They have applauded the United States for having supported UN action in the Congo at a time when Britain and other United States allies were balking.

Thus, the outlook for the future is for continued cordiality toward the United States. The American public, shocked by Goa, may find it difficult to reciprocate. The Kennedy Administration, however, is expected to bend over backwards to promote friendship because of India's size, its economic struggle, its efforts to avoid communism and the hope that Nehru may have a moderating influence in Asia and Africa.

But by no means will this diminish India's friendship for the Soviet Union. Most educated Indians seem convinced, rightly or wrongly, that coexistence is possible, that Moscow truly wants peace, that they are fortunate to have Russia's friendship while they are feuding with China and that they need Soviet economic aid. They also clearly enjoy the role of having countries of opposing ideologies bid for their friendship.

Relations with Britain

India's relations with Britain have been on a much more even keel. As Vera Micheles Dean pointed out in her book, *New Patterns of Democracy in India*, "Britain, shorn of its imperial power, was no longer a threat to India's national interests, and the Indians, once free, found that they could benefit by a new-found friendship with their former ruler, whose political ideals and administrative methods they had admired in the past."

When India became a republic in 1950, it eagerly retained its membership in the British Commonwealth. As Nehru told the Commonwealth Press Union last November, this bond represents a "real, basic association" in which "there is great virtue."

"Independent countries," the prime minister added, "have evolved their own policies, not inhibited in any way, and yet trying to function together and meeting together and trying to understand each other. This, I am quite sure, is good for all parties concerned."

Indians tend to regard Britain as a potentially moderating influence on the United States, which has replaced it as the dominant Western power. Sometimes, however, they view the British as more extreme. They have felt this way about the British ambivalence toward the Congo and Portuguese colonialism.

The Kashmir Dispute

India's relations with its big Asian neighbors are marred by tension. Nearly 15 years after partition of the subcontinent, bitterness persists between India and Pakistan, centered on the dispute over possession of Kashmir.

The population of Kashmir is 77 percent Muslim. It had been ruled, however, by a Hindu maharaja, who vacillated about accession to either India or Pakistan. He acceded to India after Pakistani tribesmen invaded the state in October 1947. New Delhi then sent troops to Kashmir, as did Pakistan. Bitter warfare

ensued. A cease-fire under UN supervision became effective on January 1, 1949.

Since then Pakistan has controlled about one-third of Kashmir (the north and extreme west) and India, the remainder. Both countries, though badly in need of resources for economic development, have spent enormous sums on the maintenance of huge military establishments in the state, which is about the size of Minnesota.

At the heart of the dispute is the fertile Vale of Kashmir, a basin about 85 miles long and 25 miles wide—less than 2.5 percent of the state. It is held by India and coveted by Pakistan. For both countries, its value is primarily one of prestige, for it is far from self-sufficient and its economic potential, though perhaps good, would be costly to develop. Over the years, however, emotions over the dispute have grown to the point where a settlement is extremely difficult to visualize.

Pakistan would probably be willing to do without the Hindu-dominated Jammu district of Kashmir and hard-to-reach, barren Ladakh. India does not especially want the areas that Pakistan controls and would be satisfied to have the cease-fire line, with minor modifications, become a permanent boundary.

To Pakistanis, however, this would be untenable. They are convinced that they could win the valley in a plebiscite, which several UN resolutions have urged. New Delhi contends that the late maharaja's accession made Kashmir an integral part of India. It says that this was reaffirmed through the adoption of a constitution in India-held Kashmir and general elections. It says that conditions have changed to such an extent since 1947 that a plebiscite would be impossible.

Several lesser disputes between India and Pakistan have been settled amicably, though some only after prolonged negotiations. The biggest concerned the use of the waters of the Indus river and its tributaries, which flow into both countries. This agreement was signed in Karachi in September 1960 with the assistance of the World Bank only after a consortium of countries had agreed to put up most of the money for works involved.

Relations between India and Pakistan are psychologically complicated by the division of many families between the two countries. Of many Muslim families that lived for generations in what is now India, some members migrated to Pakistan after partition while others remained behind. In a few families, close relatives—even brothers—are divided between the Indian and Pakistani foreign services. Occasionally once-close friends who were brought up together but who were separated by partition meet again. They embrace and reminisce about old times. More often than not, according to observations by this writer in Karachi, New Delhi, Calcutta and Lahore, they can act as if nothing has happened to divide them—until someone mentions Kashmir.

Relations with Red China

The Indian public's attitude toward Communist China has shifted within a few years from admiration to hostility. Indians feel they have been double-crossed after having tried to get Peking into the UN, having acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and having joined with Peking in the formulation in 1954 of the so-called "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence."

Hostility centers on Chinese claims, first made public in 1959, to 51,000 square miles that India contends belong to her. The Chinese have occupied at least 12,000 square miles of this and have probed across other parts of what India considers to be the frontier.

Peking's motives are a subject of considerable speculation. The theory that sounds most reasonable to this writer is that the Chinese are determined to prevent India from becoming a flourishing democracy and, thereby, setting an example for other underdeveloped countries. Through irksome probes and border claims, the Chinese are said to want, not war, but to goad India into diverting resources from economic development into defense, such as has been done in the Kashmir dispute.

Those who hold this view believe that the Chinese would be pleased if India gave up nonalignment and sided with the West

against them. Peking is said to believe that such a decision would be extremely unpopular with the Indian masses and might pave the way for a revolution.

Yet it is interesting to note that Nationalist China has never repudiated the Chinese Communist border claims. In fact, Peking has been using some Nationalist maps. This lends credence to a view that Peking's claims merely reflect traditional Chinese expansionism and possibly even contempt for India.

In an apparent attempt to isolate India from its other neighbors, Peking has reached boundary agreements with Burma and Nepal.

New Delhi is frankly worried about a recent Chinese agreement to help the Nepalese build a road between Katmandu and Tibet. This agreement could open Nepal freely to Communist infiltration and subversion.

India has a special position in regard to the Himalayan states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. All are economically dependent upon India. Nepal, though sovereign, has a treaty with India that requires the two countries to inform each other in case of "friction or misunderstanding with any neighboring state." Nehru warned in Parliament on November 27, 1959 that any aggression against Nepal "would be considered by us aggression on India."

India and the Future

We have reviewed some of the changes which have taken place in India over the last 15 years, since the British set it free. We have seen signs of progress and of reaction. We have seen how India hopes to develop within a democratic framework, but we have also seen some of the tremendous obstacles this 15-year-old nation faces.

Will India succeed? The answer appears highly problematical. Certainly the last 15 years have laid the basis for continuing stable government. The nucleus of basic industrialization has been built. There is an impetus for a peaceful rural revolution, if only the people accept the idea that one is necessary.

What India appears to need most at home is greater integration of its diverse peoples—a willingness to work hard for the common good. It also needs better domestic statesmanship—a willingness among potential leaders to accept responsibility, even if they must work in the dominating shadow of Nehru, rather than submitting blindly to his leadership or withdrawing from politics. In the international sphere India seems to need prolonged world peace, the friendship of countries which can help and a settlement of regional problems that divert resources and attention. India also seems to need a little less self-righteousness and perhaps a sharpened ability to explain itself convincingly and patiently to the rest of the world.

All this is a great deal to ask. The West has no choice, however, but to give help and encouragement. If India succeeds, it will probably be the most powerful force in Asia in favor of democracy. Although it may shun formal alignment with other countries, its implied bonds with the rest of the non-Communist world will be strong.

If India fails, it may take all the uncommitted nations of Asia and even Africa with it. The future for the West would then be dim, indeed.

Talking It Over

IN THIS DISCUSSION GUIDE YOU WILL FIND discussion topics, reading references and recommended visual aids arranged for a series of eight meetings. These are suggestions only—a starting point to help you plan a study-group program or a classroom teaching unit.

For further suggestions or for assistance in organizing a discussion series or study project, write to Foreign Policy Association, 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, New York.

Discussion Questions

1. The Meaning of Freedom

What persons have had the greatest influence on recent Indian history and how has this influence been demonstrated?

What major problems did India face when the British left?

To what extent has freedom fulfilled its promise?

READING REFERENCES

- Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, *India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative*. Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, New Delhi, Orient Longmans, 1959.
- Bourke-White, Margaret, *Halfway to Freedom*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1949.
- Brecher, Michael, *Nehru: A Political Biography*. London, Oxford University Press, 1959.
- Brown, D. Mackenzie, *The White Umbrella*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1953.
- Menon, V. P., *The Transfer of Power in India*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Moraes, Frank, *Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography*. New York, Macmillan, 1956.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, *Toward Freedom*. Boston, Beacon Press, 1958. (A paperback edition.)
- Wallbank, T. Walter, *A Short History of India and Pakistan from Ancient Times to the Present*. New York, The New American Library, 1958. (A paperback edition.)
- Wofford, Clare and Harris Jr., *India Afire*. New York, Day, 1951.

2. A Quest for Unity

To what extent is India beset by divisive tendencies?

Why is language so important in India? What kinds of problems are created by language differences?

What problems do you see in the relationship between the central government and the various states? What are the risks of greater autonomy for the states? of a stronger central government?

READING REFERENCES

- Harrison, Selig S., *India: The Most Dangerous Decades*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1960.
- Panikkar, K. M., *Hindu Society at Cross Roads*. Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1955.
- Sheean, Vincent, *Nehru: The Years of Power*. New York, Random House, 1960.
- Weiner, Myron, *Party Politics in India: The Development of a Multi-Party System*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1957.

3. Politics and Power

What are the dominant forces in Indian politics? How have they affected the competition among political parties?

Is communism important in India? If so, in what ways?

What do you believe are the prospects for Indian democracy after Nehru?

READING REFERENCES

- Brecher. Cited.
- Masani, M. R., *The Communist Party of India*. New York, Macmillan, 1954.
- Moraes, Frank, *India Today*. New York, Macmillan, 1960.
- Overstreet, Gene D., and Windmiller, Marshall, *Communism in India*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959.
- Palmer, Norman D., *The Indian Political System*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1961.
- Panikkar, K. M., *Common Sense About India*. London, Gollancz, 1960.

Park, Richard L., and Tinker, Irene, eds., *Leadership and Political Institutions in India*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959.
Trumbull, Robert, *As I See India*. New York, Sloane, 1956.
Weiner. Cited.

4. From Poverty to Plenty

What is meant by a socialist pattern of society?

How do Nehru's economic views differ from those of Gandhi?

What are the aims of economic planning in India and how far have plans been realized? Is more rapid industrialization desirable? Are major advances in agriculture desirable?

Do you believe the following statement accurate?—"Give the people the facilities, and they will help themselves?"

READING REFERENCES

Bowles, Chester, *Ambassador's Report*. New York, Harper, 1954.
Dean, Vera Micheles, *New Patterns of Democracy in India*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959.
India 1961. New Delhi, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.
Krishnamachari, V. T., *Planning in India*. Calcutta, Orient Longman Private Ltd., 1961.
Mayer, Albert and associates, *Pilot Project, India*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1958.
Planning Commission, Government of India, *Third Five Year Plan*. New Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1961.
Spate, O. H. K., *India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography*. New York, Dutton, 1954.
Ward, Barbara, *India and the West*. New York, Norton, 1961.

5. Hopes and Realities

What major factors influence rural India?

To what extent does caste influence Indian life today?

How important is legislation to social reform? What else is needed?

Do you believe it is necessary to curtail India's rate of population growth? Why or why not?

READING REFERENCES

Bowles. Cited.
Lengyel, Emil, *The Subcontinent of India*. New York, Scholastic Book Services, 1961.
Mayer, Adrian C., *Caste and Kinship in Central India*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1959.
Nair, Kusum, *Blossoms in the Dust*. London, Gerald Duckworth, 1961.
Natarajan, Swaminath, *A Century of Social Reform in India*. London, Asia Publishing House, 1959.
Srinivas, M. N., ed., *India's Villages*. 2nd rev. ed. London, Asia Publishing House, 1960.

Tennyson, Hallam, *India's Walking Saint: The Story of Vinoba Bhave*. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1955.
Zinkin, Taya, *Caste Today*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1962.

6. Education: A Means to an End

What roles does education play in economic and political development? Does progress in education also create new problems and pressures?

What are India's greatest educational problems and needs?

READING REFERENCES

Gandhi, Mahatma, *Autobiography*. Boston, Beacon, 1957. (Paperback edition.)
Kabir, Humayun, *Education in New India*. New York, Harper, 1957.
Mudaliar, A. L., *Education in India*. New York, Asia Publishing House, 1960.
Nair. Cited.
Roots of Change. New York, The Ford Foundation, November 1961.

7. An Indian View of the World

What does nonalignment mean and why has India chosen it?

Why does India's view often differ from that of the West?

To what extent is India the spokesman for the uncommitted countries?

India preaches peace for the world. But is there peace and stability in South Asia?

READING REFERENCES

Birdwood, Lord, *Two Nations and Kashmir*. London, Hale, 1956.
Dean, Vera Micheles, *The Nature of the Non-Western World*. New York, The New American Library, 1957. (Paperback edition.)
Fisher, Margaret W. and Bondurant, Joan V., *Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations*. Berkeley, University of California, February 1956.
Jain, Girilal, *Panchsheela and After*. London, Asia Publishing House, 1960.
Nehru, Jawaharlal, *India's Foreign Policy*. Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961. New Delhi, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.
Panikkar, K. M., *A Survey of Indian History*. London, Meridian Books, 1947.

8. India and the United States

Do you believe Nehru really likes or admires the United States? Why or why not?

Would India benefit from an alliance with the United States? Would the United States benefit? Why or why not?

Do you think United States economic aid has influenced Indian foreign policy? If so, how?

READING REFERENCES

Bowles. Cited.

Brown, W. Norman, *The United States and India and Pakistan*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953.

Harrison, Selig S., ed., *India and the United States*. New York, Macmillan, 1961.

Seligman, Eustace, *What The United States Can Do About India*. New York, New York University Press, 1956.

Talbot, Phillips, and Poplai, S. L., *India and America: A Study of Their Relations*. New York, Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1958.

Visual Aids*

The following films, plus many others on different topics, are available on free loan from the Information Service of India, 2107 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 8, D.C. Films are not loaned ordinarily for private showings. Transportation charges are borne by the borrower.

Bhakra Nangal. Produced in 1958. 22 minutes. The giant multipurpose dam and hydroelectric project in Punjab.

Bhoodan Yatra. Produced in 1958. 22 minutes. The walking tour of Acharya Vinoba Bhave in a search for land gifts for the landless.

The Great Experiment. Produced in 1952. 9.5 minutes. How Indians went to the polls for the first general elections in 1952.

* Unless otherwise noted, all films are 16mm, sound, and in black and white.

Coming Next

One of the most tumultuous and disturbing revolutions in history has been under way in mainland China since the Communist take over in 1949. A noted Far East scholar explores its content, direction, achievements and failures in "Communist China—Continuing Revolution," by A. Doak Barnett in the May-June issue of the **HEADLINE SERIES**.

***number* 152**

In the next issue

**Communist China –
Continuing Revolution**

by A. Doak Barnett

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



112 624

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY